Ahmed
Abdel
Sattar.org
Transcript
of Trial
June 23, 2004
Br. Ahmed's defense attorney Paul spoke to the jury.
Please read carefully.
It's an important statement not only of Br. Ahmed's
innocence but of the factual situation in Egypt.
So what is this case about and what will the evidence
show? It is really a case about words. My client, Ahmed Abdel
Sattar, has been charged with very serious crimes based on
words that were spoken by him and others. Your job will be a
very difficult one because you will have to determine what was
my client's intent when he spoke those words. The government's
evidence will consist primarily of conversations between my
client and others, and it is from those conversations the
government will argue their case.
The reason we are here today, what brings us to this
very courtroom, is that my client has already spoken. He has
told this court he is not guilty of these crimes. And I submit
to you that after you have heard and had a chance to evaluate
the evidence or lack of evidence, you, too, will reach that
conclusion.
Though we all spent a very long time selecting you,
and you have each assured us that you will be fair and
impartial, as I stand here today I am very nervous; not just
because this is an important trial with much at stake for my
client, because it is that; but also because I recognize that
even though you have been told and will be told again by Judge
Koeltl that the government has the burden of proof throughout
this trial. The burden of proof remains at this table, the
government's table. It never moves over to this table. There
is no burden of proof by any defendant to have to prove
anything to you. And this is because my client, Mr. Sattar, as
he sitting here right now, is presumed innocent, and that
presumption of innocence remains with him as we sit here today,
as we sit here through the many months we will sit and listen
to evidence, as we sit here and listen to the summations, as we
sit here and listen to Judge Koeltl's instructions at the end
of the case. He is protected by that presumption of innocence
and it remains with him throughout, even at the time that you
get up to go into that jury room to begin your deliberations.
And it is only until and unless you are all satisfied that the
government has in fact established beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of each charge with regard to Mr. Sattar, and
then, and only then, is that presumption perhaps shattered.
And that is the law. And though that is the law, my
nervousness and fear stems from the reality of today's world,
which does not lend itself to people being very objective or
fair once they hear some of the words and names, you are going
to hear at this trial. Some of these you have already heard in
the government's opening remarks yesterday morning. Some of
them were even mentioned by Mr. Tigar in his opening remarks.
Quite simply, the mere mention of certain words or names
understandably make -- cause you to feel such anger or
discomfort that you may even flinch when you hear some of these
words and names. And you are going to have to fight against
those reactions if you are to truly fulfill your oath as a
juror and evaluate the evidence in an impartial, fair, and
objective way.
Words, places and names you will hear in no particular
order throughout this trial, words such as Jihad, Muslim,
terrorist or terrorism, the Islamic Group, fatwah, Sheikh, Abu
Sayyaf, the U.S.S. Cole, Luxor terrorist attack, World Trade
Center, Osama Bin Laden. Given the daily events of terrorism
around the world, which is all we read and hear about in the
papers and on TV, certainly since 9/11, you must not allow the
mere mention of these words and names to impair your ability to
be fair and impartial. We live in fear that something dreadful
might happen again to us here in the United States. This is
only normal.
However, as normal as that may be, you cannot allow
that fear to cloud your ability to objectively evaluate this
case. And as difficult as that may be, as we all sit in here
inside this courtroom that once was the very shadow of the
World Trade Center, you have been chosen to serve on this jury
because each of you, each and every one of you have assured us
that you will abide by the oath you took and be able to do just
that. We become a nation confronting an enemy that's
everywhere and nowhere. Our vulnerability has caused us all to
He didn't just express his opposition to the
government of Egypt in general terms by talking of the terrible
poverty and living conditions of millions of Egyptian citizens.
But he spoke out against the corruption of the government
itself and lectured on how Muslims should revolt against the
oppressor. To the sheikh that meant Nasser, Sadat or Mubarak.
And for the reason being they failed their own people.
Sheikh Rahman was a clerk, an Imam, or leader of
prayer, and an Islamic religious scholar. Sattar, a very
religious man himself, related to the sheikh's criticism of the
Egyptian government. He too views it as a government which
refuses basic rights for individuals who simply may oppose or
speak out against the inequalities that the government
encourages. Those who dare to speak out are rewarded in most
cases with imprisonment without any trial or opportunity to
defend oneself. And then ultimately the worse imaginable
prison conditions and torture.
And that, ladies and gentlemen, is for those who are
fortunate enough not to simply be killed or disappear without a
trace never to be heard from again.
Sattar was living in the United States for many years
before the sheikh came here on a tourist visa in 1990. And
since Sattar was born and lived in Egypt until he was 23 years
old, it is not surprising that he had not only heard of the
sheikh but admired him from afar. Sattar's own politics stem
change, and we recognize that.
And, consequently, our government has been going after
those it sees as its enemy. Rest assured, ladies and
gentlemen, this man, Ahmed Abdel Sattar, is no enemy of the
United States. He is certainly not a terrorist. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
As you've already heard from the government, the
evidence in this case will include interceptions made by the
government of all of my client's telephone conversations,
e-mails and faxes for how long? Seven years. Seven years.
This resulted in approximately 90,000 interceptions of my
client. From these 90,000 interceptions you are going to hear
just a few, or at least a relatively small number from which
the government alleges has formed the charges in this case
against my client. It is for the most part based upon these
conversations that the government has charged Ahmed Abdel
Sattar with the following offenses: Conspiracy to defraud the
United States, conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons in a
foreign country, solicitation of crimes of violence. The
reason these charges sound so serious is because they are.
But when I tell you that this is a case about words
and nothing more, that is because as serious and violent as
these crimes sound, rest assured, there will not be any
evidence and not even one allegation by the government that
anything, that anything ever happened to anyone as a direct
result of anything my client ever said or did.
Having said that, however, let me caution you, ladies
and gentlemen, that you are indeed going to hear evidence of
violence during this trial. And you got a bit of that from the
government's opening yesterday. There will be evidence of
violence regarding hostages who were held by a rebel group in
the Philippines. This group calls itself Abu Sayyaf. And in
or about March of 2000, it issued a long list of demands.
There were many demands. And these demands were issued on the
Philippine government in return for the release of the hostages
they were holding. And included on this very long list of
demands for the release of these hostages was a demand for
Sheikh Rahman to be released from prison here in the United
States. That is the connection of that incident to this case.
You will also hear evidence of violence concerning the
killing and wounding of many tourists at an archeological site
in Luxor, Egypt on November 17, 1997. In determining the
connection and importance of that incident to this case, keep
in mind that this act of brutal violence -- and it was an act
of brutal violence -- took place four months after there had
been a call for peace by the Islamic Group with the Egyptian
government. And this so-called peace initiative was supported
by Sheikh Rahman. If this is alleged to have in fact been done
by the Islamic Group, then I submit to you it was clearly done
by some splintered group operating on its own without authority
from anyone.
The government will also present evidence of violence
concerning the bombing of the United States naval vessel, the
U.S.S. Cole. This took place in Yemen on October 12, 2000 and
resulted in the death of many U.S. crew members, as well as the
wounding of several U.S. crew members.
What is the connection of this bombing to this case,
you may ask? Let me tell you. The only connection the U.S.S.
Cole has to this case is a phone call that Sattar received on
October 25, 2000 from an individual you have already heard
about and you will be hearing about during this trial, Rifa'i
Ahmad Taha Musa, or simply Taha. In this conversation Taha
told Sattar that he had reported -- had heard it reported that
one of the people responsible for the bombing involving the
U.S.S. Cole was an Egyptian male. What Taha wanted to know was
if this information could be utilized in any way for purposes
of negotiating with the U.S. Government in gaining better
prison conditions for Sheikh Rahman.
Taha apparently believed that if it could be suggested
that this incident somehow occurred as a reaction to the severe
prison conditions of the Sheikh, then perhaps the U.S.
Government would indeed reevaluate the Sheikh's severe prison
restrictions. Sattar told Taha that he had absolutely no way
of knowing whether this information could be utilized in any
way. But what he tells Taha is, he says, listen, I will pass
this along to one of the lawyers representing the Sheikh;
specifically, Ramsey Clark. I'll pass it along to Mr. Clark
and let him decide whether this can be utilized in any way in
negotiating with the government concerning Sheikh Rahman's
prison conditions.
As it turns out, Sattar never does pass this
information along to Ramsey Clark. In fact, the evidence will
show that nothing thereafter regarding the U.S.S. Cole was ever
discussed or happens until nine months later, on July 13, 2001,
when the conversation that Sattar had had with Taha is conveyed
to the Sheikh during a prison visit. That, ladies and
gentlemen, is the entire extent of any connection of the U.S.S.
Cole to this case. It is nothing but talk.
In fact, the government will admit and the Court will
so instruct you at the appropriate time that with respect to
the Abu Sayyaf kidnapping of hostages, with respect to the
Luxor killings, with respect to the U.S.S. Cole bombing, there
is no allegation that my client had anything to do with or
participated in any way in any of these events. Once again,
let me make this perfectly clear. The evidence will show that
in fact there are no victims who the government will refer to
and say, ladies and gentlemen, these people are the victims
caused by what Mr. Sattar said or did. That's not going to
happen. The government does not claim that Ahmed Abdel Sattar
or anyone else on his behalf ever caused harm to anyone, or
that any of his conversations or actions resulted in injury to
anyone.
What it comes down to is that my client is charged
with intending or agreeing with others through his
communications that violence should occur. In fact, ladies and
gentlemen, the evidence will show that Mr. Sattar never had any
such intent. So what you as the jurors will have to decide,
after you have listened to all of the evidence in this case,
is, what was Ahmed Abdel Sattar's actual intent or state of
mind during these many conversations? How do you determine
what's intent based upon conversations or words that were used?
I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that in order
for you to be able to make a factual determination of the true
intent of my client when you listen to any communications he
may have had, you will have to ask yourself and evaluate two
important things. First, you will have to place these
intercepted communications in context. This means you will
have to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the
conversations at the time they were made. And, second, you
will have to evaluate and understand the person himself, his
background, his political and religious beliefs, who is this
person, Ahmed Abdel Sattar? What is he about? During this
trial we will attempt to show you both, who Ahmed Abdel Sattar
really is and in what context these intercepted conversations
were made.
Let's start with what the evidence will show about my
client. Unless you know who he is, where he comes from, what
makes him tick, you really cannot evaluate or begin to
understand his true intentions based only on his reported
words.
He was barn in Cairo, Egypt in 1959, where several of
his immediate family still reside. In 1979 to 1981, he served
in the Egyptian army, which is the only time, I might add, he
ever possessed a weapon. He lived in Egypt until he came to
New York on a tourist visa and settled in Brooklyn in 1982. He
thereafter met and married his wife Lisa, an American citizen
who was born and raised in this country. She grew up in a
catholic home. And in 1993, she converted to the Muslim faith.
He and his wife have four children together and they currently
live in Staten Island. In 1985, he received his U.S. residence
card and in 1989 he became a United States citizen.
In 1988, Mr. Sattar began working at the U.S. Post
Office where he worked right up until the day he was arrested
in April 2002, which, I might add, is the only time he has ever
been arrested in his life.
Contrary to the government's argument and the serious
charges brought against Sattar, he is not a man of violence,
and everything he ever did was done in the open. His life was
an open book for you to see, for me to see, for them to see.
You will see from that and hear from his many interviews he had
with the press that what Sattar knew from living in this
country for many years was that if you wanted to make your
case, which for him was to make people aware of the horrific
conditions suffered every day in Egypt, as well as the American
government's terrible policies toward the Middle East, then you
had to do what I referred to as work the press. This means he
had to continue to be available to the press and make his
position known. He did this time and time again.
You will learn from his many interviews with the press
that Sattar's position regarding violence and terrorism is very
clear. He personally condemns terrorist acts of violence. In
fact, he condemns all killing, doesn't matter where it happens.
He believes that killing innocent people is not a solution for
anything. Does he sympathize, however, with those who
represent armed opposition? Yes. But only if it is in
self-defense to those who oppress the helpless, such as the
Egyptian government with its own people, and then only if
negotiations fail.
Is he saddened that America is no longer viewed in the
eyes of the Islamic world as it once was, namely, the oasis for
democracy and hope? Yes. Is he opposed to the American
government's policies when it comes to support for Egypt,
Israel and the Middle East? Yes. Do his politics and his
opposition to America's policies toward Egypt, Israel, and the
Middle East cause him to want any harm to come to this country?
No. Never.
You have already heard a great deal about Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman, and much of the evidence in this case will have
to do with the Sheikh. In fact, as I recall, Mr. Morvillo in
his opening, the very first thing he did yesterday, put the
picture of the Sheikh right up on that screen. Therefore, to
fully understand my client it is also important for you to have
some understanding of how and why was my client drawn to Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman. What was it about the Sheikh that attracted
Sattar to him? The evidence will show that Sheikh Rahman, like
Sattar, is Egyptian. He was considered by many Egyptians to be
very brave simply because he did not fear speaking out against
the cruel treatment of millions of Egyptians by the Egyptian
government.
He didn't just express his opposition to the
government of Egypt in general terms by talking of the terrible
poverty and living conditions of millions of Egyptian citizens.
But he spoke out against the corruption of the government
itself and lectured on how Muslims should revolt against the
oppressor. To the sheikh that meant Nasser, Sadat or Mubarak.
And for the reason being they failed their own people.
Sheikh Rahman was a clerk, an Imam, or leader of
prayer, and an Islamic religious scholar. Sattar, a very
religious man himself, related to the sheikh's criticism of the
Egyptian government. He too views it as a government which
refuses basic rights for individuals who simply may oppose or
speak out against the inequalities that the government
encourages. Those who dare to speak out are rewarded in most
cases with imprisonment without any trial or opportunity to
defend oneself. And then ultimately the worse imaginable
prison conditions and torture.
And that, ladies and gentlemen, is for those who are
fortunate enough not to simply be killed or disappear without a
trace never to be heard from again.
Sattar was living in the United States for many years
before the sheikh came here on a tourist visa in 1990. And
since Sattar was born and lived in Egypt until he was 23 years
old, it is not surprising that he had not only heard of the
sheikh but admired him from afar. Sattar's own politics stem
from growing up in Egypt under one dictatorship after another
and seeing firsthand how the people have no hope for a better
life.
Here in the United States he was politically
frustrated that the U.S. government would think only of Egypt
as an ally and friend since it is seen as a more moderate
Arabic country than some of its neighbors. To Sattar, however,
it is a country he loves but has always been governed by an
oppressive government. Everything about Sattar's politics --
everything -- is directed at wanting to see change in Egypt.
And it was for this reason he looked to the sheikh as a symbol
and a spokesman for that very possibility. If any of his
politics is directed towards the United States, it is only as
it pertains to the United States foreign policy towards the
Middle East. He is a U.S. citizen who loves this country --
his country -- deeply. The fact that he may disagree with its
policies does not lessen his love for it.
So it was this admiration for the sheikh's politics
toward Egypt, coupled with Sattar's own Islamic activism, that
caused him to attend the sermons given by the sheikh at
different mosques here in New York City and New Jersey. When
the sheikh was arrested in 1993 and faced various charges in
this court, Sattar was approved by the court to work as a
paralegal, along with other paralegals, to assist several
lawyers who represented the sheikh.
One of the lawyers he met and worked with during this
time period was his co-defendant in this case, Lynne Stewart.
Another lawyer he worked with in assisting the sheikh was
Ramsey Clark who, as you heard several times, was the U.S.
Attorney general during the Lyndon Johnson administration.
Sattar also met at this time his other co-defendant,
Mohammed Yousry, a translator who also worked on the sheikh's
case. Both Sattar's closeness and belief in some, but
certainly not all -- and I emphasize "not all" -- of the
sheikh's opinions continued even after the sheikh was convicted
and sentenced to life imprisonment. To this day Sattar firmly
believes that the sheikh was unjustly convicted for the crimes
he was charged with.
As early as 1997, when the sheikh had already been
placed in solitary confinement in a special housing unit in
prison, he expressed his wishes to those who were working on
his case. What he wanted was a committee to be formed to
monitor his case, letters to be sent to both politicians and
newspapers, and for press releases issued to the media.
Whatever role Sattar found himself in after the sheikh was
tried and convicted was not one that he sought. It was thrust
upon him simply due to both his closeness to the sheikh as a
paralegal on his case and working on his case, and a believer
in the sheikh's courage against Egypt.
He attempted to satisfy the sheikh's wishes. He
helped form a committee to monitor the sheikh's case and gather
support for the sheikh even after he was convicted. This had
several purposes. One was to lobby and pressure prison
officials for better conditions of confinement for the sheikh.
This was necessary since the sheikh had been placed under the
most restrictive and severe conditions imaginable. He had been
segregated from other inmates and placed in solitary
confinement and was eventually cutoff completely from the
outside world and any contact with all visitors except his
lawyers.
Another purpose for the committee was simply to
attempt to keep the sheikh's name out there in the public
arena, both in the press as well as the Islamic world. It was
important to Sattar that the sheikh not be forgotten simply
because he was in prison. He felt it was his duty and
obligation that the sheikh's voice continued to be heard
throughout the Islamic community. This was important because
it was Sattar's belief that the sheikh was one of the few
remaining Arab leaders whose voice should not be silenced.
All of this required Sattar to play what I describe as
rough politics. He did this by becoming a demonstrator, a
communicator, and press secretary, all on behalf of the sheikh.
Clearly, ladies and gentlemen, Sattar was not, never
was, was never looked at or viewed as a policy maker. He was
never a decision-maker, or even, I might add, ever a member of
this group you have heard about referred to as the Islamic
Group.
However, having been placed in this role he found
himself communicating with individuals he had never
communicated with before or for that matter to this date ever
met. And from those communications the government has brought
these charges. Of course, being Egyptian and a political
activist Sattar was very familiar with the Islamic Group and
its movement for change within Egypt. He also knew that the
sheikh was one of the religious and spiritual leaders for the
Islamic Group.
So what is the Islamic Group? The Islamic Group was
one of many such groups within Egypt that had fought for many
years for change. Since its inception in the late 1970s until
the present, all of its activities and actions were exclusively
focused on and targeted toward the Egyptian regime. But by the
time the sheikh was incarcerated the Islamic Group was a
movement whose leadership was scattered over three different
continents in and out of prisons. It was an organization that
by 1997 was splintered and confused.
These factions and contradictions arose within the
various members in a power struggle over questions of the peace
initiative, whether or not they should attempt to become a
political party, and how the Islamic Group should communicate
and negotiate, if indeed at all, with the Mubarak government.
Due to Sattar's initial role as a paralegal for the
sheikh he communicated with many different individuals who
represented these varying factions. He became a messenger for
the sheikh. These individuals reached out to him, not the
other way around. Because they knew he was in contact with the
sheikh and the sheikh's lawyers. It was through these many
communications that he also came to speak with one of the more
militant individuals connected with the Islamic Group, this man
Taha. Like the others who reached out to Sattar, Taha was an
individual he had never previously spoken with or met.
Certainly not a friend as described yesterday by the
government.
Let me take this moment once again to caution you. As
I indicated earlier, your true challenge, I think, in this case
is not to allow your emotions to get in the way of your being
objective and impartial. I say this now because in fact, as
you heard yesterday, you will hear about a statement issued by
Osama Bin Laden and signed by Taha and others in 1998 calling
for Muslims to kill Americans. It was a statement, I might
add, which the leaders of the Islamic Group both denounced and
criticized Taha for having supported. They felt it distracted
from their true enemy, the Egyptian government, and only caused
more problems for openly opposing America.
You will also see a videotape that was broadcast in
September of 2000. In this tape Taha is seen along with Osama
Bin Laden and others where they, like others before and others
after them, called for the release of Sheikh Rahman. Again, I
implore you not to let the mere mention or even in this case
viewing of Osama Bin Laden prejudice your ability to
objectively evaluate the evidence as it pertains to Sattar.
That Sattar had contact with many different individuals,
including Taha, who was more extreme than others, says nothing
about his own beliefs and certainly nothing about his intent.
Don't allow yourself to apply guilt against Sattar simply by
those he associated and spoke with. In other words, avoid the
trap of guilt by association, because it's such an easy and
unfair trap to fall into.
I told you some of what you will learn about the
person of Ahmed Abdel Sattar, as well as how he came to be
communicating with others, in order to assist you in
determining the intent behind these words that you are going to
hear, but, as I said, you will also have an opportunity through
the evidence in this case to evaluate and form an understanding
of his intent by putting his conversations in context of what
was happening at the time they took place.
As with any conversation, you cannot just look at the
literal meaning of the spoken words to determine one's true
intent. You have to look behind and beyond the words
themselves. This is true of the communications my client had
involving the fatwah, the peace initiative, and the efforts to
assist an individual in Egypt, which we also heard about
yesterday -- Atia.
Let's start with the fatwah.
To simply look at the words alone, there is absolutely
no way to describe them except to say they are hateful and they
are ugly. I don't believe anyone would disagree with that.
But in what context were they used? When were they used? Why
was this statement issued in the name of the sheikh? What was
Sattar's true intent, meaning, and purpose in assisting Taha in
writing this fatwah or statement? Was it something done and
expressed in the heat of the moment?
The evidence will show that this statement was issued
in early October 2000. It was not issued in a vacuum of world
events. Since many of you may not recall the news events being
reported during this time of what was happening in Israel, let
me remind you.
On September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, who at that time
was the hardline head of Israel's parliamentary opposition,
made an extraordinary visit to Jerusalem's holiest site, the
compound around al-Aqsa Mosque. This was considered by many in
the Muslim world to be nothing more than a provocation. It was
clearly done to provoke and instigate a reaction on the part of
the Palestinians, and it achieved its goal. There were, in
fact, demonstrations.
It was also during this time on October 2, 2000, that
a French cameraman captured shocking footage which was
continually broadcast over the TV day in and day out. I am
sure many of you may actually remember those vivid images very
well. It was footage of a 12-year-old Palestinian boy being
protected by his father who was hovering over him against a
wall, pleading with those who were shooting, and in this case
it was the Israeli soldiers shooting at the Palestinians who
were demonstrating, and he was against this wall hovered over,
pleading, putting his hands up telling them to stop. And the
footage went on and it showed not only the shooting of the
father but the killing of that 12-year-old boy.
It was during this time period, and in this context,
that conversations were intercepted between Taha and Sattar.
In these conversations you will hear how Sattar expressed
sadness over what had happened in Israel. He was also upset
that even though the Palestinian people and Islamic community
around the world were demonstrating against what was happening,
there were no so-called Arab leaders speaking out and
expressing their own outrage over these incidents.
You will learn that Sattar is a firm believer that
when atrocities are committed against his people, the great
leaders should stand and speak out, stand strong and speak out
against such actions. You will also hear how he felt that the
Arab world community was abandoned by their leaders during this
time. It was clear to Sattar that it was his duty to have the
sheikh respond to what was happening in Israel, whether in jail
and isolated from the world or not.
So when Taha called Sattar and tells him that he wants
to write a statement in the name of the sheikh to respond to
the news and he asks Sattar if he would edit it and assist him,
Sattar agrees. Taha then writes this statement, or fatwah, in
the name of the sheikh and sends it to Sattar to review, which
Sattar does. He changes the title of this statement to make it
clear that it is directed at the Israelis, and then he sends it
out for it to be issued on a Web site.
To Sattar this statement simply represented a way to
get the people talking and wake the Arab leaders up to at least
speak out regarding what was happening to the Palestinian
people. He never, ever, considered this statement to be either
a solicitation of violence or a terrorist statement. To him it
was only a statement to defend those who were being trampled on
by Israel. It was an attempt to show those who were being
oppressed that there were leaders still out there, such as
Sheikh Rahman, who had not forgotten them.
Were the words terrible? Absolutely. But what was
Sattar's true purpose and intent in agreeing to assist in the
writing of this statement? It was done to have the sheikh's
voice heard during a major world event. It was also Sattar's
own reaction in the heat of the moment to the silence of other
Arab leaders for not speaking out on behalf of those who have
no voice of their own.
It clearly was never his intent for anyone to be
killed. It is also clear that it was received in the Islamic
community the way it was intended. It provided the sheikh's
voice to the debate against Israel's policy toward the
Palestinians and people in fact demonstrated and spoke out. It
was not issued for any other purpose than this and it certainly
was not issued by Sattar with the intent on his part to either
conspire to kill or to solicit violence.
Let me talk about what the evidence will show
concerning the peace initiative.
What was the peace initiative? The initiative was
pronounced by the Islamic Group on July 5, 1997. It was the
Islamic Group's attempt to negotiate in peace with the Egyptian
government. It was an attempt to gain something in return for
taking the position that the Islamic Group would negotiate in
good faith and through peaceful means. What they wanted to
achieve was a positive response from the Egyptian government.
They had hoped that in return for this peace
initiative the Egyptian government would release prisoners who
were being held without ever having been afforded due process
or, at a minimum, they wanted better treatment for those who
were being held in the dungeons of the Egyptian prisons. Years
went by with the initiative in place and nothing really
significant ever happening by way of a response from the
Egyptian government. In fact, in late 1999, four members of
the Islamic Group were murdered by the Egyptian government and
it appeared, to some at least, that the peace initiative was
not working and in its existing form.
What developed thereafter were different positions
from many individuals. Ultimately this resulted in at least
two different factions that differed on how to best negotiate
with the Egyptian government. One faction was located from
within Egypt and it had contact with the prisoners themselves.
They wanted to continue to negotiate the way they had been for
years. This faction realized that even though there had been
very little progress and change on the part of the Egyptian
government, certainly toward the prisoners, certainly in
releasing them, giving them better conditions, however, they
were fearful that the government would retaliate against the
prisoners if there was a breakdown in negotiations.
The other faction located outside of Egypt felt the
Islamic Group should take more of a hardline position. In
other words, they believed that unless the Egyptian authorities
began to do something to show their good faith, such as the
release of prisoners, better prison conditions, or at least due
process for new prisoners, then why should they continue to
take a peaceful approach?
This other faction believed in negotiating with the
Egyptian government from a position of strength. Like in any
negotiations between two parties, it was their belief that even
if they were incapable or had the ability to do this they
should at least let the Egyptian government believe that they
might very well.
In other words, the Egyptian government need not know
that they had not the ability or capability. And those who
felt this way, like Taha, believed that the government would
never do anything unless there was this concern or fear on
their part. And though this group also accepted the initiative
in principle, they refused to offer it free of charge to the
Egyptian government. In other words, they refused to endorse
the initiative unconditionally and without benefits in return
for the Islamic Group and others. They felt the initiative had
hurt, not helped, the Islamic Group and that the Islamic Group,
as well as the prisoners, would have been better off if the
initiative was implemented in stages.
They believed that unless they negotiated from a
position of at least potential strength the Egyptian government
would never respond. Why should it? They had nothing to fear
and it wasn't exactly in the government's interest to release
those who they believed were working against its very
existence. This is what Sattar was facing when he talked with
Taha and others about the initiative.
You will hear from Sattar's conversations with the
sheikh's son, and others, that he was simply pushed into this
role and placed in the middle of these different factions. He
did, however, feel very strongly that all viewpoints should be
heard and presented to the sheikh. What Taha wanted was simply
not to be shut out by those who felt differently. He also
wanted support from the sheikh so that he would not be ignored.
Sattar simply felt that Taha's position should at least be
heard because he too felt the peace initiative was not working.
Sattar believed that based on history at least the
Egyptian government would only negotiate out of fear of
possible military actions.
That doesn't mean, ladies and gentlemen, that he
believed or had any such intentions that military or violent
acts should actually be carried out or that the Islamic Group
should return to the days of violence. It simply meant that
the Islamic Group should negotiate by putting more pressure on
the Egyptian government and renegotiate from a position of
strength, even if in reality the Islamic Group had absolutely
none.
Sattar was asked to find out what the sheikh's
position was on this matter and at least support the idea that
Taha's position be considered -- nothing more, nothing less.
And that is all Sattar attempted to do by communicating with
the sheikh about the initiative.
That brings me to another subject of this indictment
which you will be asked to consider as well, as mentioned by
Mr. Morvillo yesterday. This has to do with an individual
named Atia. There are several conversations between Sattar and
individuals in Egypt regarding this man Atia that take place
over several months. This isn't just one or two conversations
contained within a few weeks. Sattar found himself connecting
Taha and others with those inside of Egypt who were allies of
Atia and were trying to help him get out of the country and
away from the Egyptian authorities.
The evidence will show that Sattar attempted to do
nothing more than assist Atia in escaping from Egypt. He did
not even know who this person was at first -- this person who
was trying to get out. All he came to realize was that Atia
was a fellow Egyptian in need of help. If Taha had any
additional agenda beyond wanting to communicate his own point
of view to Atia, Sattar did not share in that agenda. Sattar's
only concern was to help a brother get out of Egypt.
It certainly was no secret to Sattar that if anyone
was a fugitive from the Egyptian authorities he was in grave
danger if caught. The result would be torture and/or death.
And it was for this reason, and this reason alone, that Sattar
assisted in providing the communication link for Atia to others
in attempting to flee Egypt. Tragically, as it turned out,
Sattar's worst fears were realized. Atia was in fact captured
and killed by the Egyptian police on October 18, 2000. Sattar
understandably was devastated because he felt responsible. It
was his belief at the time that the Egyptian authorities had
somehow intercepted his communications with Atia and his allies
and, consequently, were able to track him down.
It is interesting to note that the only evidence in
this case where anyone -- anyone -- is ever a victim during
either the time period that the government maintains was a
conspiracy to kill or kidnap or the conspiracy to solicit
violence was the killing of Atia, and that was done by the
Egyptian police.
In conclusion, let me just say that both the
allegations that Sattar conspired with others to kill and
kidnap persons in a foreign country as stated in Count 2, and
that he solicited others to engage in violent terrorist
operations as stated in Count 3, were to have taken place from
September '99 through the date of his arrest in April 2002.
The evidence will show during this entire period of
time the United States government was intercepting all of my
client's communications right up to one month before he was
arrested. Amazing as it might seem but for those 7 years,
beginning in March '95, when coincidentally he was actually
assisting in the defense of the sheikh during his trial, and
continuing these interceptions all the way to March 2002, they
listened to every word spoken, e-mailed or faxed by my client.
They listened very carefully to my client during this entire
period. They listened to his communicating with Taha in
assisting the fatwah, in issuing the fatwah. They listened to
his assisting Atia, and they listened while he received the
sheikh's opinion on the initiative. And yet it is obvious that
during this entire time the government did not believe that any
of my client's communications was of very much concern.
Certainly he did not present any cause for alarm or fear of a
realistic, imminent threat or danger to anyone.
I submit to you that the government did not believe,
nor did it have any reason to suspect, that any of my client's
communications would result in the killing or kidnapping of
anyone or that a crime of violence was actually being solicited
and about to be committed. Why do I say this? Because the
evidence will show that the communications with the sheikh
concerning his withdrawal of support for the initiative was in
May and June of 2000. The conversations regarding the
assistance to Atia took place for several months and continued
to October 2000. And the fatwah -- this fatwah that was issued
in October 2000 -- and yet the government did not arrest my
client until April 2002, over 1-1/2 years after the fatwah.
You can be sure, ladies and gentlemen, that if the
government really suspected or feared something was about to
occur, or there was any concern that my client was a real
threat to anyone, they would not have awaited to arrest him
until 1-1/2 years later. And you can't just casually sweep
this fact under the rug as Mr. Morvillo did yesterday at the
very near end of his opening remarks. You can't just say, oh,
the reason for the delay in any arrest was really due to
national security interests that took precedence over any
criminal investigation. Really? Took precedence over someone
about to be killed or violence about to happen? I don't think
so.
I submit to you that it's more likely that Sattar
wasn't arrested for over 1-1/2 years because the U.S.
authorities never had any cause to fear Sattar because he was
never a true danger to anyone.
All of what I have said only underscores the
importance for each of you to keep an open mind and wait until
you have heard all of the evidence. If you do that, and you
evaluate the facts of this case objectively in a fair and
impartial way, then you will have upheld your oath as a fair
and impartial juror that you have assured us you would do, and
no one could ask more of you than that.
I am also confident that if you do this and apply the
facts of the case to the law as given to you by Judge Koeltl at
the end of this case, then you will agree that the government
has failed to prove Ahmed Abdel Sattar guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as to any of the charges and your verdict
should be just that -- not guilty.
Thank you.